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A recent Korean film, “National Security”, about a democracy activist 
and former Korean politician, Kim Geun-Tae, who was kidnapped and 
tortured into making a false confession by police in 1985, has renewed 
debate among South Koreans about the state of transitional justice in the 
country. From 1995 to 2010, South Korea took a number of steps to 
expose the political oppressions and human rights abuses of its past 
authoritarian governments and to assist individuals involved in the 
struggle for democracy to clear their names and restore their 
reputations. This article analyzes the relative success and failure of South 
Korea’s truth seeking process and the prospect for the realization of 
transitional justice in the country in the future. 
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Better to light one small candle than to curse the darkness. 
-Chinese Proverb1 
 A recent Korean film, “National Security” (Namyoung-dong 1985 
in Korean), is based on the memoir by Kim Geun-Tae, a democracy 
activist and former Korean politician, who was kidnapped and tortured 
into making a false confession by police in 1985 during the Chun Doo-
Hwan regime.2 The release of this film renewed debate among South 
Koreans about the state of transitional justice in the country. Despite 
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1 Author unknown. 
2 Kim Do-Hyung, Torture Expert Lee Geun-An: “It Was a Kind of Art”, KOREAN 
STORY (Dec. 13, 2011), http://koreanstory.wordpress.com/2011/12/13/torture-
expert-lee-geun-an-that-was-a-kind-of-art/ (describing the real-life “faceless 
torture expert” who tortured Kim Lee Geun-An, who asserted that he was not a 
torture expert but “an interrogation expert.”). 
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claims by those opposed to investigating past crimes such as current 
President Park Geun-Hye (the daughter of former South Korean dictator 
Park Chun-Hee), who has referred to South Korea’s truth seeking process 
as a “worthless scam”, 3 this article will show that many unresolved cases 
remain. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Torture, forced disappearances, extra-judicial killings and mass 
executions occurred with disturbing regularity in Korea from the end of 
World War II until the election of Kim Young-Sam in 1993. 4  Some 
estimate that as many as 100,000 people were executed by governmental 
authorities.5 Further, many South Koreans have been fighting to clear their 
names of political subversion charges from the military regimes of the 
1960s and 1980s.6  With the election of President Park, South Korea has, 
in all likelihood, closed the book on its attempts at transitional justice. 
From 1995 to 2010, however, South Korea took a number of steps to 
expose the political oppressions and human rights abuses of its past 
authoritarian governments and to assist individuals involved in the 
struggle for democracy in order to clear their names and restore their 
reputations. In 2010, when the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was 
shut down, Commission President Lee Young-Jo stated: “Even if we 
                                                 
 
 
3 See Son Byung-Kwan, Addressed and Concluded by Law? Park Geun-Hye 
Should Apologise, OHMYNEWS NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 23, 2007) (translated from 
Korean by Jeong-Min Lee), 
http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0000387
883 (noting that on August 29, 2004 at a dinner party, Park Geun-Hye was 
requested to comment on her father’s rule of South Korea, she stated that these 
issues have “already been addressed and concluded by law. If these issues were to 
be readdressed, it should be done after thorough legal examination, and shouldn’t 
condemn politicians”). 
4 See Choe Sang-Hun, In Seoul’s Red Scare, Redemption is Elusive For Accused 
Spies, An Agonizing Wait For Justice in a Still Divided Country, INTERNATIONAL 
HERALD TRIBUNE, Mar. 10, 2007 (describing the agony suffered by the Venerable 
Bong-Wang, a Buddhist monk who was tortured with electric shocks until he 
signed a confession that he was a communist spy and how in 1998, after 15 years 
in prison, he was released only to find his family had deserted him out of fear of 
being associated with a confessed communist). 
5 Ashley Rowland and Hwang Hae-Rym, Time Running Out on South Korea’s 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, STARS AND STRIPES (Jan. 19, 2010), 
available at http://www.stripes.com/news/time-running-out-on-south-korea-s-
truth-and-reconciliation-commission-1.98156. 
6 Choe, supra note 4. 
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investigated more, there's not much more to be revealed.”7 This article 
analyzes the veracity of Mr. Lee’s statements within the context of the 
various attempts that South Korea has made in dealing with the human 
rights abuses of the regimes that ruled Korea since the end of the Korean 
War. 
Part I of this paper provides a brief overview of modern history of 
Korea, including a description of the authoritative regimes that controlled 
South Korea from 1960 until 1993.  Part II describes the various attempts 
by South Korea to address crimes committed by its former authoritative 
regimes and to restore the honor of those accused of crimes under those 
regime. Part III will discuss the degree to which South Korea’s attempts at 
transitional justice have been realized.8 This paper concludes with analysis 
of the relative success and failure of South Korea’s truth seeking process 
and the prospect for the realization of transitional justice in the country in 
the future.  
II. OVERVIEW OF MODERN KOREAN HISTORY 
Korea’s modern history begins with Japan’s defeat in World War 
II.  In 1945, the United Nations divided Korea at the 38th Parallel in 
accordance with an agreement wherein the Soviet Union would administer 
the north and the United States the south.9  When the Soviets and the 
United States could not agree on the implementation of joint trusteeship 
                                                 
 
 
7 Charles J. Hanley and Hyung-Jin Kim, South Korea Shuts Down Korean-war 
Human Rights Probe, Largely Absolves U.S., ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jul. 11, 2010, 
http://www.cleveland.com/world/index.ssf/2010/07/south_korea_shuts_down_kor
ean-.html. 
8 See INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, 
http://www.ictj.org/en/tj/ (The International Center for Transitional Justice 
provides that transitional justice “refers to a range of approaches that societies 
undertake to reckon with legacies of widespread or systematic human rights abuse 
as they move from a period of violent conflict or oppression towards peace, 
democracy, the rule of law, and respect for individual and collective rights”). 
Other commentators have stated that key elements of transitional justice are truth 
telling and accountability.  See, e.g., Geoff Gentilucci, Truth-Telling and 
Accountability in Democratizing Nations: The Cases Against Chile’s Augusta 
Pinochet and South Korea’s Chun Doo-Hwan and Roh Tae-Woo, 5 CONN. PUB. 
INT. L.J. 80 (2005), available at http://cpilj.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/5-conn-
pub-int-l-j-79.pdf. 
9 See Bruce Cumings, KOREA: A PLACE IN THE SUN (W.W. Norton, 2th ed. 2005); 
see also KOREAN HISTORY PROJECT, 
http://www.koreanhistoryproject.org/Jta/Kr/KrGOV0.htm. 
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for the entire country, separate governments were established in 1948, 
with each claiming to be the legitimate government of all Korea.10   
A. First Republic (1953 – 1960) 
On August 15, 1948 the Republic of Korea (South Korea) was 
formally established and with the backing of the United States, Syng-Man 
Rhee was elected as the Republic’s first president.11  Rhee immediately 
began instituting a variety of reforms, including land reform, wherein the 
government confiscated and redistributed all land formerly held by the 
Japanese colonial government, Japanese companies, and individual 
Japanese colonists.12  The Rhee government also followed a policy of 
brutal repression of leftist activity and instituted harsh reprisals against 
any and all threats by groups with perceived leftist leanings such as labor 
unions and university student groups.13  Because the United States saw 
Rhee as ballast against the communist north, South Korea was the 
beneficiary of vast sums of American aid.  In fact, in some years 
American aid to the south totaled the entire size of South Korea’s national 
budget.14  
On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea. Led 
by the United States, a 16-member coalition undertook the first collective 
military action under the United Nations Command. Constantly changing 
battle lines inflicted high civilian casualties and wrought near total 
destruction on the entire peninsula. With China’s entry on behalf of North 
Korea in 1951, fighting came to a stalemate close to the original line of 
demarcation. Armistice negotiations, initiated in July 1951, finally 
                                                 
 
 
10 Id.  
11 Lee Ki-Baik, A NEW HISTORY OF KOREA (1990). 
12 Id. 
13 See id. (Government perception that labor unions and university student groups 
were sympathetic to North Korea and thus a threat to the rulers in the south 
continued through the 1980s); see also James F. Person, New East German and 
Soviet Evidence on North Korean Support to South Korean Political Parties and 
Labor Unions, WILSON CENTER,  http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/new-
east-german-and-soviet-evidence-north-korean-support-to-south-korean-political 
(discussing newly translated German and Russian documents from 1960 which 
indicate that North Korea provided political and material support to South Korean 
political parties, labor unions, and student groups) (last visited May 7, 2014). 
14 Cumings, supra note 9, 255, 306. 
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concluded on July 27, 1953 at Panmunjom, now in the Demilitarized Zone 
(DMZ).15 
Throughout his rule, Rhee went to great lengths to ensure that he 
would stay in power. Rhee pushed through constitutional amendments that 
made the presidency a directly elected position and promulgated an 
amendment, which exempted him from the constitutionally mandated 
eight-year term limit.16  However, in 1960, violent repressions of student 
demonstrations on the day of the presidential election touched off massive 
protesting and Rhee resigned amid widespread social strife.17 
B. Second Republic (1960 - 1961) 
 After the student revolution, power was briefly held by an interim 
administration until a new parliamentary election was held on July 29, 
1960.18  The Democratic Party, which had been in opposition during the 
First Republic, gained power and established the Second Republic, which 
adopted a parliamentary system where the President took only a nominal 
role.19  
During the Second Republic there was a proliferation of political 
activity, which had been repressed under the Rhee regime.20  Much of this 
activity was from leftist and student groups, which had been instrumental 
                                                 
 
 
15 One sticking point to peace was the size of the flags at the negotiating table.  
Giving new meaning to the phrase “Napoleon complex”, each day when the 
opposing sides met, their accompanying flags were larger than the previous day.  
This gamesmanship continued until the flagpoles would no longer fit in the 
barracks where the negotiations were taking place. The issue was finally settled 
when both sides agreed to place their respective flagpoles outside the barracks.  
(An American soldier told me this anecdote during a visit to the DMZ in 1997). 
See also Brandon K. Gaulthier, What was It Like to Negotiate with North Koreans 
6o Years Ago, THE ATLANTIC (JULY 26, 2013), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/07/what-it-was-like-to-
negotiate-with-north-koreans-60-years-ago/278130/ (discussing other North 
Korean tactics such as shortening the legs of his chairs to make its generals seem 
taller and noting that when a United Nations flag was on the conference table, a 
bigger North Korean flag appeared alongside it after a break in the negotiations). 
16 Lee Wa-Rang, Who Was Rhee Sygnman?, KIMSOFT (Feb. 22, 2000),  
http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/55a/186.html. 
17 Id. 
18 See Yang Sung-Chul, THE NORTH & SOUTH KOREAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS 193 
(2001). 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
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in the overthrow of the First Republic.21 Union membership and political 
activity grew rapidly during the later months of 1960.22  
Under pressure from the left, the government carried out a series 
of purges of military and police officials who had been involved in anti-
democratic activities or corruption.23  The government passed a Special 
Law to this effect on October 31, 1960, wherein 40,000 people were 
placed under investigation. Of those investigated, more than 2,200 
government officials and 4,000 police officers were purged for their 
activities under the Rhee government.24 
C. Military Rule (1961 – 1962)  
 The Second Republic ended on May 16, 1961, when Major 
General Park Chung-Hee staged a coup d'état.25  Under pressure from the 
Kennedy administration, Park promised a return to civilian rule.26  On 
December 2, 1962, the country held a referendum on returning to a 
presidential system of rule, which purportedly passed with a 78.8% 
majority. 27   Despite Park’s pledge not to run for office in the next 
elections, Park ran anyway, narrowly winning the presidency in 1963.28  
D. Third Republic (1963 – 1972) 
 Park ran for president again in 1967, winning the presidency in a 
closely contested race.29  At the time, the presidency was constitutionally 
                                                 
 
 
21 Id. 
22 See Yang, supra note 18, at 193—94 (approximating 2,000 demonstrations held 
during the eight months of the Second Republic). 
23 Id. 
24 See Andrew C. Nahm, KOREA: TRADITION & TRANSFORMATION 411 (Hollym 
International Corp., 2d ed. 1985)  (There was also great economic unrest at the 
time. For example, Korea’s currency lost half of its value against the dollar 
between fall 1960 and spring 1961). 
25 Seung-Mi Han, The New Community Movement: Park Chung-Hee and the 
Making of State Populism in Korea, 77 PACIFIC AFFAIRS 69, 73 (2004).   
26 See Apoorv Agarwal, Park Chung Hee: Another Dictator or a Saviour, SIMPLY 
DECODED (March 20, 2013), http://www.simplydecoded.com/2013/03/20/park-
chung-hee/ (discussing Park’s rise to power and 18-year dictatorial rule of South 
Korea). 
27 See ANDREA M. SAVADA & WILLIAM SHAW, SOUTH KOREA: A COUNTRY 
STUDY (Library of Congress, 4th ed. 1992)  
28 Id.  
29 Id. 
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limited to two terms.  Park, however, forced a constitutional amendment 
through the National Assembly in 1969, which allowed him to seek a third 
term.30  He was re-elected in the 1971 presidential election.31  
During the Third Republic, South Korea maintained close ties 
with and continued to receive a substantial amount of aid from the United 
States.  A status of forces agreement adopted in 1965, clarified the legal 
situation of the U.S. forces stationed in the country.32  Soon thereafter, 
South Korea joined the Vietnam War, eventually sending a total of 
300,000 soldiers to fight alongside U.S. and South Vietnamese troops.33  
The South Korean economy grew rapidly during this period. The 
Park regime used the influx of foreign aid to provide negative interest 
loans to export businesses.34 However, as the economy grew so did Park’s 
power.  Park declared martial law on October 17, 1972, dissolving the 
                                                 
 
 
30 Nahm, supra note 24, at 423. 
31 The leading opposition candidate at the time was Kim Dae-Jung, a political 
dissident and who was elected President of South Korea in 1997. The government 
made two attempts on Kim’s life. The first was a car accident allegedly staged by 
the KCIA, which left Kim with a permanent limp. The other incident occurred 
when the KCIA reportedly kidnapped Kim from a hotel in Japan and trundled him 
onto a fishing boat. Kim was later quoted as saying that a weight had been 
attached to his feet aboard the boat heading toward Korea, indicating that the 
kidnappers had intended to drown him by throwing him into the sea. They were, 
however, forced to abandon this plan, as the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force 
began a pursuit of the kidnappers’ boat. Subsequently, Kim was released in the 
port city of Pusan. According to some reports the U.S. Ambassador at the time 
intervened with the South Korean government to save Kim's life. See Carol Clark, 
Kim Dae-Jung: From Prison to President, CNN, available at 
http://archive.today/UYC6K; see also Kim Dae-Jung Biography, THE FAMOUS 
PEOPLE, http://www.thefamouspeople.com/profiles/kim-dae-jung-52.php 
32 There are approximately 28,500 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea.  See 
Thomas Shanker, Gates Urges More Japanese Action on Global Security, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 9, 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/09/world/asia/09gates.html?ref=asia.  
33 See Don Kirk, Confronting Korea’s Agony in Vietnam, INTERNATIONAL 
HERALD TRIBUNE (Sep. 28, 2002), 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2002/09/28/blue_ed3_.php. 
34 Although Park was without question a brutal dictator, he remains very popular 
because most South Koreans give Park credit for its miraculous economic 
development. See Donald Gregg, Park Chung Hee, TIME (Aug. 23 1999), 
http://www.time.com/time/asia/asia/magazine/1999/990823/park1.html. 
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National Assembly and announcing plans to eliminate the popular election 
of the president.35 
E. Fourth Republic (1972 – 1979) 
 The Fourth Republic began with the adoption of the Yushin 
Constitution on November 21, 1972.36  The Yushin Constitution gave Park 
effective control over the parliament. In the face of continuing popular 
unrest, Park promulgated a series of emergency decrees in 1974 and 1975, 
which banned people from engaging in actions that challenged the Yushin 
Constitution and led to the prosecution and imprisonment of hundreds of 
dissidents.37 
 Judges enforced the special decrees for President Park to 
perpetuate his rule and control the population.38 Under the law, citizens 
were punished just for criticizing the government while talking with 
friends in pubs, classrooms or on the streets.39  Recently, one of these 
former judges, surnamed Lee, expressed his feelings about his special 
decree rulings: “I always feel regret about the rulings I made under the 
Emergency Measures Act. But they were in inevitable. My heart aches 
when I think about the past, and I think we, including the government, are 
fully responsible for it.” 40 
F. Fifth Republic (1979 - 1987) 
                                                 
 
 
35 See Donald Gregg, Park Chung Hee, TIME (Aug. 23 1999), 
http://www.time.com/time/asia/asia/magazine/1999/990823/park1.html.  
36 The Yushin Constitution remained in effect until Park’s death at which time the 
country reverted to its “original” constitution, originally adopted on July 17, 1948.  
This constitution has been amended nine times and is in effect today.  See 
DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION], available at 
http://english.ccourt.go.kr/home/att_file/download/Constitution_ 
of_the_Republic_of_Korea.pdf (S. Kor.). 
37 There are many cases of individuals prosecuted under Park’s emergency 
decrees, many times for simply making an off-handed statement critical of Park.  
For example, a construction worker was sentenced to eight months in prison for 
drunkenly stating that Park “wants to be president forever.”  Drunks Criticizing 
President Punished Under Park's Rule, KOREA TIMES, Jan. 25, 2007, available at 
2007 WLNR 3005044. 
38 Annie I. Bang, Park Decrees Undermined Justice, KOREA HERALD (Apr. 5, 
2010), http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20070131000088. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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The head of the KCIA assassinated Park in 1979 while the two 
were having dinner. 41   Park’s assassination led to a popular uprising, 
composed primarily of university students and labor unions.  The protests 
reached a climax after Park’s second in command, General Chun Doo-
Hwan, seized power and declared martial law.42  On May 18, 1980, a 
confrontation broke out in the city of Kwangju between students of 
Chonnam National University (protesting against the closure of their 
university) and the police.43  The confrontation turned into a citywide riot 
that lasted nine days.44 The government quelled the riot by sending in the 
army, including special-forces units that reportedly hunted down and 
executed the leaders of the protest, as well as innocent civilians. 45  
Estimates of the death toll, as a result of what is now referred to as the 
Kwangju Massacre, range as high as 2,000.46  Public outrage over the 
killings consolidated nationwide support for democracy, paving the road 
for the first democratic elections in 1987.47 
G. Sixth Republic (1987 - 1992) 
 In 1987, Roh Tae-Woo, one of Chun’s military colleagues in the 
1979 coup was elected to the president by the popular vote.  In 1993, Kim 
Young-Sam was elected as South Korea’s first civilian president in 30 
                                                 
 
 
41 There were two previous attempts on Park’s life.  On January 28, 1968, a 31-
man detachment from North Korea crossed the DMZ with the purpose of killing 
Park.  They made it within 800 meters of the Blue House (Korea’s version of the 
White House) dressed in ROK uniforms before they were discovered.  In the 
ensuing firefight that occurred over the course of several days, 68 South Koreans 
and three Americans died.  The second assassination attempt, launched again by 
North Korea, occurred when Park was delivering a speech during a ceremony 
celebrating South Korea’s liberation from Japanese rule.  A North Korean agent 
fired shots from the front row of the audience.  The bullets missed Park who had 
finished his speech but struck his wife, who died later from her wounds.  See 
Donald Gregg, Park Chung Hee, TIME (Aug. 23, 1999), 
http://www.time.com/time/asia/asia/magazine/1999/990823/park1.html. 
42 See Sheryl WuDunn, Korea Indicts Two Former Presidents in Staging 1979 
Coup, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 22, 1995), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/22/world/south-korea-indicts-2-former-
presidents-in-staging-of-1979-coup.html.  
43 See Flashback: The Kwangju Massacre, BRIT. BROADCASTING CORPORATION 
(May 17, 2000), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/752055.stm 
44 Id. 
45 Id.  
46 Id. 
47 Id.   
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years.  South Korea’s commitment to democratize its political processes 
reached the end of a long bloody road in 1997 with the election of Kim 
Dae-Jung. Kim’s election represented the first peaceful transfer of 
government between parties in South Korea.  
III. THE ROLE OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN SOUTH 
KOREA 
 For more than a decade, South Korea has taken a number of steps 
towards rectifying wrongs perpetrated by the authoritarian military 
regimes, which ruled the country since 1961.48  The following is a brief 
description of each piece of legislation and the legal and/or political 
challenges each faced. 
A. Special Act Regarding May 18 Democratization Movement 
(1995) 
In the early 1990’s there was a great deal of public demand for 
justice for the victims of the “democratization movement”.49  Although 
Kim Young-Sam strongly criticized the actions of former presidents Chun 
and Roh, he believed prosecution of the two might lead to political and 
social unrest.50  Kim argued against criminal prosecution of the former 
presidents stating: “truth should be reserved for historical judgment in the 
future.”51  From a legal perspective, there was concern that the prosecution 
of previous military dictators may be barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations. 52  As debate raged amongst politicians and the public, the 
Seoul Prosecutor’s Office made the controversial decision to suspend the 
                                                 
 
 
48 Kuk Cho, Transitional Justice in Korea: Legally Coping With Past Wrongs 
After Democratization, 16 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y J. 579 (2007). 
49 Id. at 581. (Under President Kim Young-Sam many dissidents were 
“rehabilitated” insofar as they ascribed the status of “democratization movement 
involvers” who took part in the “democratization movement”, as opposed to 
communist sympathizers fomenting social unrest and engaged in criminality).  
See, e.g., Gwangju Minjuhwa Undong Gwanryeonja Bosang Deungye Gwanhan 
Beobyul [Act for Compensation for the Victims in the Democratization 
Movement in Kwangju], Act No. 4266, Aug. 6, 1990 (S. Kor.). 
50 Cho, supra note 48, at 581-82. (Kim entered the Blue House with the support of 
many high-ranking military leaders and thus, was reluctant to resort to criminal 
punishment for mutiny, insurrection and murder for the former military leaders). 
51 Id. at 581. 
52 Id. at 582. 
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prosecution of the military leaders.53  Although the Prosecutor’s Office 
determined the 1979 coup involved crimes of mutiny, insurrection and 
murder, and that the suppression of the 1980 Kwangju uprising constituted 
treason and murder, it found that prosecution of these crimes were barred 
by the statute of limitations.54   
The Korean Constitutional Court addressed this issue in 1995 
when, in a majority decision, it declared that a prospective prosecution of 
the two formers dictators was constitutional insofar as it did not violate the 
statute of limitations. 55   The Court held that under Article 84 of the 
Constitution, statutes of limitations are stayed while a president is in office 
except for crimes of insurrection and treason.56  The Court determined, 
however, that it would not intervene in prosecutorial decisions, noting the 
conflict between “realizing justice” by punishing former military leaders 
and the danger of fomenting social confrontation that such prosecutions 
would create.57 
When the government and the legal system refused to push forth 
with prosecutions of Chun and Roh, South Korean citizens again took to 
the streets in 1995. As a result, the National Assembly passed the Special 
Act Concerning May 18 Democratization Movement (the “Act”).58  The 
Act suspended the statute of limitations for “crimes against constitutional 
order” that had been committed on or around December 12, 1979 and May 
18, 1980, the dates relating to the coup and to the Kwangju massacre.59  
The Act also provided for the right to re-trial for those deemed to have 
                                                 
 
 
53 Id. at 581. 
54 Id. at 582. 
55 Id.  The KCC was established in September 1988 and is modeled on the 
European model, insofar as it is specialized court that determines constitutional 
laws, disputes between governmental entities, Constitution Complaints filed by 
individual, impeachments and dissolution of political parties.  The justices are 
appointed by the president with the approval of the National Assembly and serve 
six-year renewable terms.  Decisions rendered by the KCC are final and cannot be 
appealed.  See CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOREA, http://english.ccourt.go.kr.   
56 DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] [CONSTITUTION] art. 84 (S. Kor.) 
(“[t]he President cannot be charged with a criminal offense during his tenure of 
office except for insurrection or treason.”) 
57 Cho, supra note 48, at 582.   
58 Id. at 582—83. (The final straw was the revelation that both Chun and Roh had 
amassed huge sums of money in bribes received during their respective 
presidencies). 
59 Minjuhwa Undong Deung E Gwanhan Teukbyeol Beop [Special Act 
Concerning May 18 Democratization Movement], Act. No. 5029, Dec. 21, 1995 
(S. Kor.). 
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been punished because of their involvement in the democracy 
movement.60  As a result, the Seoul District Prosecutor’s Office initiated 
criminal proceedings for treason against Chun, Roh and other former 
high-ranking officials.61 
The defendants filed a motion with the KCC, challenging the 
constitutionality of the Act asserting: (1) it violated equal protection 
principles, as it was directed only to punish a specific group of 
individuals; and (2) constituted retrospective punishment and thus, 
violated ex post facto principles. 62   The Court, however, upheld the 
constitutionality of the Act, determining that despite the fact that the Act 
was created to prosecute a narrow set of individuals, it was not per se 
unconstitutional.63  Relying heavily on public policy as the foundation of 
its decision, the Court determined that the Act was founded upon a 
national demand to rectify past wrongs and establish “legitimate” 
constitutionalism in South Korea.64 
On the ex post facto issue, the Court held that because the 
Supreme Court at that time had not decided the issue of whether the 
statute of limitations expired when the Act was passed, the court found 
that it would not be unconstitutional to extend the statute of limitations.65  
Importantly, the justices failed to agree whether the statute of limitations 
had already expired, with four justices holding the Act was constitutional 
                                                 
 
 
60 Id. 
61 Cho, supra note 48, at 583. 
62 Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 96 HunKa 2, Feb. 16, 1996, (8-1 KCCR, 51) 
(S. Kor.) (noting that ex post facto criminal punishment is prohibited by the 
Korean Constitution under the Article 12 (1) (enshrining the principle of due 
process) and Article 13 (1) (specifically prohibiting prosecutions acts that do not 
constitute crimes under the law in force when the act is committed).  For 
background on the role of the Constitutional Court in South Korea, see 
Jurisdiction, CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOREA, 
http://english.ccourt.go.kr/home/english/jurisdiction/faq.jsp (last visited Apr. 17, 
2014) (the Korean Constitutional Court was established in September 1988 and is 
based on the European model insofar as it is a specialized court that determines 
constitutional laws, disputes between governmental entities, constitution 
complaints filed by individuals, impeachments and dissolution of political parties. 
The Court’s justices are appointed by the president with the approval of the 
National Assembly and serve six-year renewable terms.  Decisions rendered by 
the KCC are final and cannot be appealed.). 
63 Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 96 HunKa 2, Feb. 16, 1996, (8-1 KCCR, 51) 
(S. Kor.). 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
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and five finding in favor of unconstitutionality.66  Under Korean law a 
finding of unconstitutionality requires a vote of six or more justices and 
therefore, the five-justice dissent did not meet the threshold for a 
determination that the Act was unconstitutional.67 
The Supreme Court affirmed the defendants’ convictions for 
treason and killing for the purpose of treason, holding: 
The defendants grasped political power after they stopped 
the exercise of the authority constitutional state 
institutions by mutiny and rebellion.  Even if they had 
arguably ruled the State based on the constitution, which 
was revised by popular referendum, it should not be 
overlooked that a new legal order was established by 
mutiny and rebellion.  It cannot be tolerated under any 
circumstances under our constitutional order to stop the 
exercise of the authority of constitutional state institutions 
and grasp political power by violence, not following 
democratic procedure.  Therefore, the mutiny and 
rebellion can be punishable.68 
The Supreme Court affirmed Chun’s conviction and sentence to life in 
prison and Roh’s conviction and sentence of 17 years in prison, as well as 
upholding the convictions and sentences of 23 of their subordinates.69  In 
1997, all those convicted under the Act received presidential pardons and 
were released from prison.70  No other soldiers or government officials 
were punished. 
B. Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths (2001) 
                                                 
 
 
66 Id. 
67 Id.  
68 Cho, supra note 48, at 584. 
69 Id. The Supreme Court only examined issues related to the defendants’ 
convictions and sentences for treason and killing for the purpose of treason and 
not constitutional issues, which were resolved by the KCC in its Decision of 
February 16, 1996, 96 HunKa 2.  See e.g., Constitutional Court, supra note 62. 
70 See Andrew Pollack, Two Dictators Leave Korean Jails, Pardoned After Two 
Years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1997, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/23/world/2-
ex-dictators-leave-korea-jails-pardoned-after-2-years.html?pagewanted=print 
(reporting that at the time of the article Kim Dae-Jung agreed to the pardons as a 
means “unify the country”). 
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 In 2001, the National Assembly established a commission to 
investigate deaths of individuals who were involved in South Korea’s pro-
democracy movement and who died under suspicious circumstances.  The 
Commission was, however, hampered by the fact that most of the deaths it 
was investigating occurred many years ago, usually long after the 
expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.  As a result, most of the 
individuals who tortured, murdered and gave false testimony to convict 
innocent citizens remain unpunished due to the legal impediment of 
statutes of limitations for these crimes.71  Again, civil and human rights 
groups strongly argued in favor of legislation, which would allow for 
prosecutions of those involved in past crimes by extending statutes of 
limitations.72  However, two bills that would allow for circumvention of 
various statues of limitations for those accused of perpetrating crimes 
against those involved in the democracy movement failed to pass the 
National Assembly.73 
C. The Act for Restoring the Honor of Democratization Movement 
and Providing Compensation for Them (2000) 
 In 2000, the government passed legislation (hereinafter the 
“Democracy Act”) the purpose of which was to recognize the sacrifice, 
and in some cases, provide compensation for those determined to have 
been involved in South Korea’s “democracy movement”. 74   The 
Democracy Act established the right of resistance against South Korea’s 
illegitimate regimes. 75   The Democracy Act established a Review 
Commission (the “Commission”) to review applications made by 
individuals who asserted they were involved in the democracy movement 
                                                 
 
 
71 See Cho, supra note 48, at 585 (Under Korea’s Criminal Procedure Code, 
crimes such as murder are subject to a 15 year statute of limitations). 
72 See Andrew Pollack, 2 Ex-Dictators Leave Korea Jails, pardoned after 2 Years, 
THE NEW YORK TIMES (DEC. 23, 1993), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9403E3D7153EF930A15751C1A
961958260&n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/People/R/Roh%20Tae%20Woo. 
73 Id. 
74 This term is defined as “activities that contributed to establishing democratic 
constitutional order and resurrecting and enhancing freedoms and rights of people 
by resisting authoritative rule that had disturbed free democratic basic order and 
violated people’s fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution…” Act fon 
the Honor Restoration of and Compensation to Persons Related to 
Democratization Movements, Statutes of South. Korea, Act. No. 6123, Jan. 12, 
2000 (S. Kor.). 
75 Id. 
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and were persecuted as a result. 76   Although the Commission had no 
investigative or judicial authority, it had the power to recommend pardons 
or expungement of an applicant’s conviction.77 Importantly, it also had the 
power to make recommendations to state or local governments and/or 
private companies to rehire individuals involved in the democracy 
movement. 78  Further, the Commission has made recommendations to 
schools to abolish disciplinary records and bestow honorary degrees upon 
those punished for their involvement in the democracy movement and 
suffered some detriment as a result.  In addition to this so-called “honor 
restoration”, the Commission could recommend financial compensation to 
qualified applicants.79   
 In its most high profile matter, the Commission reviewed the case 
of eight college students who, under extreme torture by the KCIA, 
admitted to being North Korean spies.  They were convicted and executed 
one day after the Supreme Court confirmed their convictions and death 
sentences.80  On December 27, 2005, after a recommendation from the 
Commission, the Seoul Central District Court re-examined the case and 
overturned the convictions.81   
 The Commission also examined a number of cases involving a 
concentration camp called the Samchung Re-education Camp, set up by 
the military. Take, for example, the case of Jean Jeong-Bae. The 
Commission found that Mr. Jean was shot on June 20, 1981 by a 
Samchung guard for protesting his arrest, detention and demand for a 
                                                 
 
 
76 Cho, supra note 48, at 590—92 (describing the Democracy Act and the Review 
Commission that examines applications by those claiming to be “democratization 
movement involvers”). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. According to Cho, as of December 28, 2006, “democratization movement 
involvers” were given $28,700,000 on compensation.  Id. at 592 (citing Dong 
Jung-Min, Recognizing 46 Illegal Labor Activists as Democratic Activists, DONG-
A ILBO, Dec. 18, 2006). 
80 Id. at 592; see also Ju Jin-Woo, The People’s Revolutionary Party, Homicide 
Committed in the Name of the Law, JU JIN-WOO’S KOREAN MODERN HISTORY 
PODCAST (SEP. 12, 2012),  
http://blog.naver.com/srchcu?Redirect=Log&logNo=30142229623, (describing 
how one defendant, Ha Jae-Wan, was caught recording North Korean radio and 
sharing with others, a crime under South Korean law and how the government at 
the time was under a lot of stress due to protests of students against Park Chung-
Hee). 
81 Choe Young-Yoon, Sentence of Innocence to the People’s Revolution Party 
Case After 32 Years, HANKOOK ILBO (JAN. 24, 2007). 
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formal trial.82  Another case involved a claim by a former inmate of the 
Samchung Camp occurred in 2001, when a man, surnamed Lee, submitted 
a petition to the Commission, calling for compensation for pain and 
suffering as a result of his incarceration at the Camp.83 The commission 
rejected his claim finding Mr. Lee was not a pro-democracy activist and 
was, therefore, not eligible for compensation from the government.84 Mr. 
Lee then brought his case to an administrative court, and in 2013 that 
court recognized Mr. Lee’s claim and ordered the government to 
compensate him. The Court stated that the 74-year-old Lee: “fought for 
democracy in the face of repression by the authorities . . . was injured due 
to his campaigning for freedom and basic rights … [and] should be 
regarded as a democracy fighter.” 85  It was the first time that a court 
recognized a surviving victim of the camp as a democracy fighter.86  
Another Commission case that garnered a lot of attention 
concerned the mysterious death of Tsche Chong-Kil, a law professor at 
Seoul National University, whose body was found at the bottom of a fire 
escape outside the KCIA building.87  The KCIA announced that Professor 
Tsche had committed suicide by throwing himself out of the building after 
                                                 
 
 
82 Cho, supra note 48, at 600; Lee Ju-Young, Presidential Truth Commission on 
Suspicious Deaths: Obligation and Compensation Regarding Samchung Re-
education Camp, OHMYNEWS NEWS AGENCY (OCT. 1, 2002), 
http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0000089
478; see also National Human Rights Commission of Korea Recommended Equal 
Compensations for Foreign Victims of Samchung Re-education Camp, ASIAN 
PACIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS INFORMATION CENTER (SEP. 5, 2006), 
http://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/newsinbrief-en/section1/2006/09/national-
human-rights-commission-of-korea-recommended-equal-compensations-for-
foreign-victims-of-sam.html (The Camp was set up under President Chun Doo-
Hwan. Detained individuals were subjected to organized violence under the name 
of “social cleansing,” which aimed at the elimination of social vices, such as 
violence, smuggling and drug use. Some 42,000 individuals were arrested without 
proper warrants and subjected "purification education" through violence and hard 
labor).   
83 Kang Hyun-Kyung, Samcheong Camp Victim to Receive Compensation, 
KOREA TIMES (JULY 2, 2013), 
http://m.koreatimes.co.kr/phone/news/view.jsp?req_newsidx=138513. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Choi Yu-Sik, Former Agent Says KCIA Murdered Professor, THE CHOSUNILBO 
(Dec. 10, 2001), 
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2001/12/10/2001121061341.html.   
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confessing that he was a North Korean spy.88  The Commission found that 
the KCIA had tortured Professor Tsche and that there was a “high 
probability” that he was killed and his body thrown out a window of the 
KCIA building.89  The Commission based its decision, in part, on the 
testimony of a former KCIA agent who stated: “[t]he official 
announcement that Professor Tsche had confessed to being a spy and 
jumped to his death was a fabrication … when he lost consciousness while 
being tortured, investigators mistook him for dead and pushed him off the 
fire exit” in order to cover up the death.90  In February 2006, the Seoul 
High Court awarded Professor Tsche’s family1.8 billion KRW 
(approximately $1.9 million) in compensation.91 
 The Commission was dissolved in 2004, with a number of 
unresolved cases before it.  The most high profile cases were those of 
Chang Joon-Ha, a leading activist against the Park regime found dead on a 
mountain in 1974 and Lee Chul-Kyu and Lee Rae-Chang, both activists, 
whose bodies were found in isolated places (a reservoir and beach 
respectively).92  Prior to its dissolution, the Commission recommended 
that the National Assembly establish a new commission with greater 
investigative powers, including the authority to punish those who refuse to 
give evidence or commit perjury before it. 93   The Commission also 
recommended passage of a law barring the application of the statutes of 
limitations for state crimes against human rights.94   
i. Whether Individuals Involved in Counter-Violence 
Should Be Acknowledged as Democracy Movement 
Involvers 
 As South Korea struggled to come to terms with its past, an 
important issue arose with regard to whether individuals who engaged in 
violent opposition to past authoritative regimes should be eligible for 
relief under the Democracy Act.  One case involved a group of Dong-Eui 
University students who staged a sit-in to protest what they considered to 
                                                 
 
 
88 See id.; see also History of Harm, TIME (June 9, 2003), 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,457405,00.html (detailing 
incidences of violence within South Korea). 
89 Id. 
90 The Final Truth About Tsche Chong-Kil, THE HANKYOREH (Mar. 19, 2004), 
http://www.hani.co.kr/section-
001100000/2004/03/001100000200403190204001.html.   
91 Cho, supra note 48, at 601. 
92 Id. at 602. 
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be corrupt university entrance exam procedures.95  When the police broke 
into the library to break-up the demonstration some students threw 
Molotov cocktails at the police.96  In the ensuing fire, seven police officers 
were burned alive and the students were convicted of the crime of murder 
by arson.97   
In 2002, the Commission determined that the forty-six students 
involved in the demonstration were, in fact, part of the democracy 
movement and should thus be absolved of their criminal liability for the 
deaths of the police officers.98  The family members of the dead officers 
filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court arguing that the decision of 
the Commission violated their constitutional rights and tarnished the 
reputations of the dead.99  The Court held that the family members lacked 
standing and that the Committee’s decision did not cast the officers in a 
negative light. 100   The police, conservative politicians and certain 
members of the media, criticized this decision asserting that the de-facto 
result of the decision was to transform cop killers into activists.101  The 
final decision of the Commission was a compromise by the court; the 
students were determined to be “democratization movement involvers” 
and the dead policemen, “officers of merit”.102 
D. The Basic Act for Coping with Past History for Truth and 
Reconciliation (2005) 
 Based on the outgoing Commission’s statements concerning the 
need for a new truth finding body and the overwhelming support of the 
public, the National Assembly enacted The Basic Act for Coping with 
Past History for Truth and Reconciliation in 2005.103 The Act established 
                                                 
 
 
95 Id. at 593—94; see also Stephen R. Weisman, Korea Addresses Abuses of Its 
Past, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 1989), available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DE5D91E3FF937A15756C0
A96F948260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all (describing the violent escalation of 
the demonstrations by Dong-Eui University students as atypical for the time). 
96 Cho, supra note 48, at 593—94. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Cho, supra note 48, at 594 (citing Decision of October 27, 2005, 2002 HunMa 
425 (Korean Constitutional Court). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 See TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 
http://www.jinsil.go.kr/English/Commission/outline.asp (last visited Apr. 6, 
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the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC”) as an independent 
organization that was given a four-year mandate to initiate investigations 
on suspicious deaths by petition or by its own volition.104  The TRC was 
made up of 15 members, eight recommended by the National Assembly, 
four appointed by the President and three nominated by the Supreme 
Court.105 The TRC had an expansive mandate. In addition to abuses under 
past regimes, the TRC was also empowered to investigate crimes 
committed during the Japanese occupation106 and the Korean War.107  The 
first President of the TRC, Father Song Gi-Im, described the purpose and 
mandate of the TRC was: “to investigate and find out the truth and take 
necessary measures to bring about reconciliation in case relating to the 
anti-Japanese independence movement, mass victimization of civilians 
before and during the Korean war, human rights violations and politically 
fabricated trials during authoritarian rule, and the like.”108 
Importantly, the TRC had the power to request relevant 
individuals to submit affidavits, appear for inquiry and submit evidence 
pertinent to its particular investigation.109   Unlike the Commission on 
Suspicious Deaths, the TRC had limited subpoena power to compel the 
                                                                                                               
 
 
2014) (outlining the mandate, organization and operation of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 See Cho, supra note 48, at 608.  There has been strong pressure by Korean 
academics and the public at large for the investigation and subsequent publishing 
of an “encyclopedia” of the names of “pro-Japanese collaborators.”  However, 
investigating and publishing the names of those involved in pro-Japanese 
activities is inherently problematic given that Japanese collaborators have likely 
long since passed away and the Korean Constitution provides that “[n]o citizen 
shall suffer unfavorable treatment on account of an act not of his own doing but 
committed by a relative.”  DAEHANMINKUK HUNBEOB [HUNBEOB] 
[CONSTITUTION] art. 13(3) (S. Kor.).  As it is almost certain that relatives of those 
on the list would suffer at the very least significant social stigmatization, there is a 
serious question whether publishing such a list would pass constitutional muster.   
107 See Chang Jae-Soon, Evidence Provokes Investigation of U.S. Navy Attack On 
Refugees Korean War, available on Westlaw at 4/14/07 PILOT-STAR 14 (Apr. 
14, 2007) (reporting on the discovery by the Associated Press in May 2007 of a 
declassified 1950 document from the U.S. ambassador in South Korea informing 
Washington that the U.S. military had adopted a policy of shooting approaching 
refugees as a means of guarding against North Korean infiltrators and describing 
a September 1, 1950 incident where the U.S. Navy allegedly fired on a group of 
refugees encamped on a beach in Pohang). 
108 Id.  
109 Cho, supra note 48, at 608. 
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appearance of individuals who refuse to appear more than three times 
without just cause. 110   In addition, it had the power to impose 
administrative fines on those who made false statements, submitted false 
information, refused or evaded the TRC’s investigation or subpoena.111 
Part of the mandate of the TRC was to recommend reconciliation between 
offenders and victims or their families based on an offenders’ repentance 
and the victims’ or families’ forgiveness.112   
 One of the most controversial decisions made by the TRC was its 
determination to publish the names of 492 justices who had rendered 
decisions in as many as 1,412 cases involving violations of emergency 
decrees under the Park regime.113  The Korean Bar Association sharply 
criticized the Commission for its decision stating that identifying the 
justices would serve only to aggravate public distrust of the judiciary.114  
Others argued that it was unfair to place all responsibility on the judges 
because they had no choice but to enforce the Park’s emergency decrees, 
as at that time, it was the law.115  Further, critics asserted that police and 
prosecutors, who arrested, indicted and forced violators of Park’s 
emergency decrees to stand trial, remained unnamed and unpunished.116  
Supporters of the Commission’s decision to publish the names have called 
for the removal of those justices who remain on the bench but to date, no 
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111 Id. at 609. 
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113 See Annie I. Bang, Truth Panel Faces Angry Backlash (January 31, 2007), 
available on Westlaw at 1/31/07 WRLDNWSC; see also Jean Yae-Hyun, How 
Should the Judiciary Deal with the Issue of Transitional Justice, NAE-IL 
NEWSPAPER (Feb. 5, 2007), available at  
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114 See id.; see also Kim Rahn, Past Wrongdoing Probe Embarrasses Park, 
KOREA TIMES (Jan. 31, 2007), available at Westlaw at 1/31/07 KORTIMES 
(discussing the assertion of Park Geun-Hye, daughter of the late dictator Park 
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115 See Unwarranted Revelation Legacy of Dictatorship Dumped on Judges, 
YONHAP ENGLISH NEWS (Feb. 2, 2007), available at 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/search1/2603000000.html?cid=AEN2007020200
0800315 (republished editorial from the Korea Times dated February 2, 2007). 
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such action has been taken.117 To the contrary, subsequent to being named 
by the TRC, most of the judges continued with their careers as judges, 
lawyers and academics, with some even serving on the Korean 
Constitutional Court and the Korean Supreme Court.118  It should be 
noted, however, that not all judges toed the party line; some judges 
followed their conscience and refused to enforce what they considered to 
be unjust decrees.119 One case is that of Lee Young-Gu who, in 1976, was 
the chief judge of Seoul Yeongdeungpo-gu district court and handed down 
a not guilty verdict to a teacher who was accused of criticizing the 
government in violation of both the Anti-Communist Law and the 
Emergency Decree No. 9. Another man, Yang Young-Tae, who was a 
High Court judge of Gwang-ju in 1975, dismissed a guilty verdict against 
a farmer who had received 3 years imprisonment and 5 years probation 
during his trial for criticizing president Park Jung-Hee.120  Both judges 
were punished for their decisions. 121  Within a month, Judge Lee was 
demoted and voluntarily left the judiciary.122 Judge Yang, remained as a 
low level judge while his compliant colleagues on the bench advanced to 
                                                 
 
 
117 Why Single Out the Judges, THE CHOSUN ILBO (Jan. 31, 2007, 9:09 AM), 
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2007/01/31/2007013161011.html; 
see also We Wholeheartedly Support the Release of the Names of Former 
‘Emergency Decree’ Justices!, THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES’ UNION 
(Feb. 1, 2007), available at http://www.gwanak-
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118 For example, Lee Kang-Kuk was named by the TRC and served as the head of 
the Korean Constitutional Court from 2007 to 2013. Biography of Lee Kang-Kuk, 
NAVER, 
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os=112327 (trans. Jeong-Min Lee); see also Seong Hye-Mi, Over Ten Current 
High-ranking Judges Including the Head of Constitutional Court and Supreme 
Court Justices, YONHAP NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 31, 2007, 10:34 PM), available at 
http://bemil.chosun.com/nbrd/bbs/view.html?b_bbs_id=10038&num=13831 
(reporting on the naming of judges by the TRC) (trans. Jeong-Min Lee). 
119 Jean Jong-Hui and Lee Chun-Jae, The Judges Who took off Their Robes for 
Making the Right Decision During the Emergency Decree, HAN GYO RAE 
NEWSPAPER (Jan. 31, 2007), 
http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/187596.html (trans. Jeong-Min 
Lee). 
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high judicial positions.123 These brave men stand out as exceptions to the 
492 justices who had enforced the emergency decrees who defended 
themselves with self-serving claims that they were only applying the 
positive law of the time and the all too familiar defense heard at 
Nuremburg that they were only following orders.124 
IV. DEVELOPMENTS FROM 2005 TO THE PRESENT 
 The TRC was dissolved in June 2010 amidst a sea of criticism 
from both its opponents and advocates.125 The TRC heard a total of 11,175 
petitions reaching final conclusion in 8,450 cases (85.6%), leaving 510 
cases (4.7%) unsolved and declined to hear 1,729 cases (15.5%).126  
The most publicized reports issued by the Commission focused on 
mass executions by South Korean authorities before and during the 1950 – 
1953 Korean War and on the killing of innocent civilians by US forces.127 
Research also focused on the suppression of leftist civilians and soldiers in 
that era and of suspected communists after North Korean forces invaded 
the south in June 1950.128 The commission also investigated killings by 
US forces, who fired on refugees streaming south following the North 
Korean invasion.129 Conservative opponents of the truth seeking process 
have criticized the reports documenting these killings, as “leftist.”130  
                                                 
 
 
123 Id. (Judge Yang was finally promoted to a judicial scholar of the Supreme 
Court). 
124 Id. 
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http://www.tongilnews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=105032 (trans. Jeong-
Min Lee). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id.  
130 Id. 
2014]  TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN SOUTH KOREA         161 
 
After assuming office in February 2008, conservative President 
Lee Myung-Bak replaced the liberal head of the TRC appointed by Roh 
Moo-Hyun with the conservative, Lee Young-Jo, as head of the 
commission. 131  The TRC soon found itself fighting budget cuts and 
restrictions on its investigative powers, which some believed was due to 
the fact that President Lee Myung-bak and his ruling conservative party 
were uncomfortable with the scrutiny of the country’s past.132 Advocates 
further asserted that the Lee government had reluctantly inherited the TRC 
and would like to see it shut down.133 The commission’s new president 
stated that, having spent 20 billion KRW ($17.79 million), the TRC had 
not been cost effective and that it should cease its work without 
extension.134 The TRC was shut down in June 2010. The term period of 
the TRC was until April 2010 and although it could have been extended 
for an additional two years, until April 2012, it was only extended for an 
additional two months.135 
When Park Geun Hye ascended to the presidency in 2013, she 
discussed forming a commission to deal with reconciliation issues, 
especially those that took place during her father’s presidency but no 
action has been taken to date.136 The progressive former head of the TRC 
doubts that Park would enact such a plan, asserting that Park’s true 
purpose is the exoneration of her father’s name.137   
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Many South Koreans are, however, demanding that further action 
be taken regarding past crimes.138 One example is that of politician Lee 
Jae-Ho, a member of the Saenuri party, recently announced that he has put 
forth the “basic law for coping with past history for truth and 
reconciliation”, which is to reactivate the Truth and Reconciliation 
Committee. 139 The proposed law would allow the Commission to work on 
their investigation for a maximum of five more years, three years for an 
initial investigation, with a possible two-year extension.140 Mr. Lee stated 
the reason for his proposal was: “because of [the TRC’s] time limit for 
petitions, many victims did not receive an official accounting of the truth 
nor recover their tarnished reputations and even subsequent remedies were 
unsatisfying.”141 Thus, a troubled cloud hangs over the state of transitional 
justice in South Korea to this day. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the claims by opponents of Korea’s truth seeking 
process, South Korea continues its struggle to free itself from the jackboot 
of its past. This is due in large part to the fact that Korean truth 
commissions can, with a few exceptions, also be characterized as 
essentially victim-centered. They have rarely punished or recommended 
punishment for offenders. 142  In fact, in most cases Korean truth 
commissions have refrained from publicizing the names of perpetrators. 
Nor have they been greatly involved in making recommendations for 
institutional reforms. Rather, the focus has been on the victims, and 
especially on revealing the truth surrounding their victimization and 
rehabilitating their reputations, phrased as “restoring their honor” in the 
preferred formulation.    
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The first question is whether there has been complete truth telling 
with regard to past crimes.143  Tragically, the answer to this question is a 
resounding no. The first Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious 
Deaths of 2001 was hampered by the lack of power to compel testimony 
and production of information, and by the impediment of the statute of 
limitations that prevented prosecution of potential suspects. South Korea 
is a state party to the Rome Statute, which allows for the tolling of statutes 
of limitations in cases of grave violations of human rights such as crimes 
against humanity.144 
The Democracy Act of 2000 made great strides towards 
reconciliation insofar as it resulted in the rehabilitation of the reputations 
of many of those involved in the democracy movement, as well providing 
financial compensation to victims and their families. The Commission was, 
however, dissolved with a number of uninvestigated and unresolved 
petitions before it.  The expectation was, however, that the TRC (with its 
expansive investigative powers) would pick up where the Commission left 
off and resolve these cases. Unfortunately, the great promise with which 
the TRC began was never realized. 
With regard to the issue of accountability for the wrongdoers, one 
could argue that this was achieved to a degree, given that two former 
presidents were prosecuted, convicted and jailed for their crimes against 
the Korean people. While it is true that the trials of Chun, Roh and their 
subordinates did provide South Koreans with a sense that some justice had 
been done, their subsequent pardons after a mere two years justifiably 
created a great deal of cynicism towards the concept of transitional 
justice.145  Moreover, no other officials, or other individuals acting under 
color of law, were brought to account for crimes committed during 
authoritative rule.146   
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The TRC was important in that it had much greater investigative 
authority than the 2001 Commission.  Further, because part of its mandate 
was to bring about reconciliation between offenders and victims, the TRC 
had a greater chance to achieve a national “healing” than South Korea’s 
previous attempts. The TRC’s promise was, however, never realized.  
Considering the recent election of President Park, it likely that they will 
remain so. Reconciliation and societal harmony can never be realized 
while these individuals remain free, safely ensconced in the bosom of the 
statutes of limitations that protect them from prosecution for their crimes. 
The solution to this is one that has been proposed a number of times to the 
National Assembly, abolish the statute of limitations for crimes against the 
Korean people and allow the perpetrators to be brought to justice.147  The 
people of South Korea are strongly in favor of such legislation and the 
KCC clearly opened the door when it found that suspending the statute of 
limitations for certain crimes was constitutional under Korean law.148  
Regarding crimes committed prior to and during the Korean War, 
many of these cases have either been under investigated or not 
investigated at all. This is very troubling given that a cable released by 
Wikileaks dated October 20, 2009, indicates that there may be as many as 
eight potential cases involving the deaths of Korean citizens at the hands 
of US forces during the Korean War.149 
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South Korea has consistently criticized Japan for its refusal to 
acknowledge its past.150 President Park herself has stated that a lack of 
trust exists between Seoul and Tokyo due to Japan’s failure to properly 
address issues of “historical variety” such as the Korean women pressed 
into sexual slavery during Japan’s occupation of Japan during World War 
II.151 South Korea’s stance is, however, weakened by the fact that the 
nation itself has failed to properly address its own issues regarding the 
past, including properly examining the issue of Korean collaboration with 
colonial era Japan.152 Until it cleanses its own closet of skeletons, South 
Korean accusations that Japan is failing to address its past, carry little 
weight. 
South Korean society is highly influenced by the Confucian 
values of societal unity and harmony. There can be no harmony in a 
society where untold numbers had their lives torn asunder without official 
recognition, where there is no accountability for those who visited 
egregious injustice upon the innocent and where unexcavated mass graves 
dot the landscape.153 As director Chung Ji-Young poignantly stated upon 
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the release of National Security: “If we triumph over the past, we can 
move forward with unity and reconciliation.”154 
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